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THE CANADIAN UNEMPLOYMENT
RATE — WITH AND WITHOUT
ALBERTA’S BOOM
Ron Kneebone
Over the past two decades there has occurred a shift in economic power
from central Canada to other parts of the country. Saskatchewan and
Newfoundland and Labrador have both claimed a noticeably larger share of
Canada’s GDP since 1995 but easily the largest shift of economic output has
been to Alberta. This adjustment in the Canadian economy is most easily
observed in the large migration between provinces of Canadians seeking
employment. Data from Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey shows
that over the period 1995-2014 Alberta has maintained an average annual
rate of growth in employment of 2.50 per cent. This is well above the 1.44
percentage rate of employment growth in second-place Ontario and double
the average rate of growth in neighbouring British Columbia. This begs the
question: What would Canada’s unemployment rate be today if Alberta’s
job creation boom hadn’t happened? Since the national jobless rate is a
weighted average of the provincial figures, getting an answer is
straightforward. Assume Alberta’s employment growth was no higher than
Ontario’s over the same period and the impact on Canada’s unemployment
rate is startling. By August 2014, Canada’s unemployment would have been
9.39 per cent — 2.23 percentage points higher than the real figure of 7.16 per
cent — and the Alberta economy would have created 411,000 fewer jobs;
jobs which typically pay $200 to $300 per week more than jobs in Ontario
and Quebec. This gloomy scenario means that Canada’s present
unemployment rate would be 2.5 percentage points higher than it was in
mid-2000, and 411,000 Canadians, along with their dependents, would be
clearly much worse off were it not for the boom in Alberta. Obviously this
simple experiment can’t capture the situation’s full economic complexity.
Would some of those jobs have cropped up in other provinces? Stubbornly
lacklustre growth could very well have forced governments and the Bank of
Canada to adopt desperate measures; it could also have damaged post-
recession recovery by increasing the federal budget deficit and limiting the
Bank’s room to manoeuvre. While admittedly simple, this exercise highlights
how reliant is Canada’s international reputation for economic strength and
fiscal parsimony on Alberta’s prolonged economic boom.
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In June 2014, a report from the Bank of Montreal summarized the recent performance of the
Canadian labour market by suggesting that “there’s Alberta, then there’s everyone else.”1 The
gist of the report is that over the previous year Alberta’s labour market has created jobs at a
prodigious rate and were it not for that performance, the economic picture in Canada might not
look so rosy.
In this short commentary two points are highlighted. First, there is nothing new in what the
BMO has reported; in fact the situation described in the BMO report is something that has
been true since about 2000. Second, the booming Alberta economy has had an important
impact on the rest of Canada and for how we evaluate the performance of the Canadian
economy.   
Statistics Canada provides detailed data on provincial labour markets; data describing the state
of each provincial labour market on a month-by-month basis. The data are from the Labour
Force Survey and are published by Statistics Canada in its CANSIM database (Table 2820087).
The data report total employment of both sexes aged 15 to 64 years and are seasonally
adjusted. Data from this source is what Statistics Canada uses to calculate unemployment rates.
One thing these data can be used to calculate is the average annual rate of growth in
employment in each province. The following table reports on these values using data spanning
the period January 1995 to August 2014.
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN EMPLOYMENT, 1995-2014
The average annual growth rate in Alberta, at 2.50 per cent per year, stands out. It is
considerably higher than the runner-up, Ontario, and twice the average annual rate of growth in
British Columbia. For the past 20 years, therefore, Alberta’s labour market has been the engine
that has pulled along the Canadian economic train.
The fact that the Canadian unemployment rate is a weighted average of the unemployment
rates of the provinces means we can run a simple experiment that goes a long way to
answering the following question: What would the Canadian unemployment rate be today had
it not been for the boom in job creation in Alberta? 
A simple way of doing this is to use the data provided by Statistics Canada to calculate how
employment in Alberta would have changed had the labour market in that province performed
differently. It is then a simple matter to calculate what the national unemployment rate would
have been under that scenario.
There are lots of variations on this experiment that one could entertain. The one to be focused
on here is the implication for the national unemployment rate had Alberta’s economy created
jobs at the same annual rate as Ontario. That is, suppose, starting in January 1995, employment
in Alberta grew at an average annual rate of 1.44 per cent instead of 2.50 per cent. What would
this mean for the national unemployment rate?
1 Reported in the Globe and Mail, June 10, 2014 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/top-business-
stories/bmo-on-canadas-economy-theres-alberta-then-theres-everyone-else/article19088317/). 
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THE CANADIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WITH AND WITHOUT THE BOOM IN ALBERTA
The chart shows the implication of this hypothetical experiment for the Canadian
unemployment rate since 1995. The blue line shows the actual (observed) Canadian
unemployment rate. The movement in that line reflects actual movements in the Canadian
unemployment rate. The red line (counterfactual) shows what the Canadian unemployment rate
would have looked like had employment in Alberta grown at the same rate as employment in
Ontario since 1995.
The difference between the two scenarios is startling. 
By August 2014, the unemployment rate that we observe in Canada (7.16 per cent as shown by
the blue line) would have been 9.39 per cent had employment in Alberta grown at the same
rate as it did in Ontario (as shown by the red line, the counterfactual). That is a 2.23 percentage
point difference in the national unemployment rate. That difference is explained by the fact that
had employment in Alberta grown at the same rate as employment in Ontario over the period
1995-2014, then by August 2014 there would have been 411,000 fewer jobs.
That last observation in the graph showing the 2.23 percentage-point difference in the
Canadian unemployment rate is interesting, but so too is the pattern of change in the red and
blue lines since 1995 and particularly since 2000.
For example, the decline actually observed (blue line) in Canada’s unemployment rate from
late 2003 to early 2008 would have been only half as large had employment in Alberta grown
at the same rate as employment in Ontario (the red line). In fact, as measured by the Canadian
unemployment rate, the performance of the Canadian economy would have been judged rather
lacklustre were it not for Alberta’s boom. This same pattern occurred again following the
recent recession. Although we have observed a fall in the Canadian unemployment rate since
the end of the recession, had Alberta’s labour market grown at the rate of Ontario’s the national
unemployment rate would only have fallen by half as much and would today be creeping back
upward.
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The graph also shows that whereas the observed unemployment rate in Canada is today almost
exactly what it was in 2000, had Alberta’s labour market only produced jobs at the same rate as
Ontario’s labour market, the national unemployment rate today would be 2.5 percentage points
higher (9.39 per cent) than it was in mid-2000 (6.80 per cent). Finally, looking at the whole
period described in the graph, whereas today the national unemployment rate is nearly three
percentage points lower than in 1995, had Alberta’s boom not happened the national
unemployment rate would be virtually the same as it was 20 years ago.
All this is interesting but care should be taken to interpret calculations like these. Implicit in
these calculations are some important assumptions. For example, in calculating the
counterfactual experiment, the hypothetical slowdown in the rate of growth in Alberta’s labour
market is assumed not to affect the size of the Canadian labour force. Labour economists
would predict, however, that the higher wages paid in Alberta as a result of the boom attracted
more people into the labour force.2 Thus, in the counterfactual that eliminates the Alberta
boom, the size of the labour force should be adjusted downward and with this adjustment the
national unemployment rate associated with the counterfactual would be somewhat smaller as
well.
The counterfactual also assumes that the rate of growth in employment in other provinces is
not affected by the hypothetical Alberta slowdown. It is difficult to know how this
consideration might influence the calculations. On the one hand, Alberta’s boom has surely led
to job creation in other provinces (think steel for pipelines and locomotives for trains) so the
hypothetical slowdown in Alberta would slow job creation in other provinces. If so, the
unemployment rate associated with the counterfactual would be even larger than shown. One
the other hand, the boom in Alberta may also have created jobs that would otherwise have been
created in other provinces; the so-called Dutch disease argument. Proponents of this view
would suggest that the hypothetical slowdown in Alberta would have been good for job
creation in other provinces causing the national unemployment associated with the
counterfactual to be lower than shown.3
A careful analysis of the effects on the Canadian economy of Alberta’s boom would need to
account for a myriad of other economic influences as well. Economists like to joke that it is
difficult to accurately and fully describe the effects of counterfactual experiments because
“everything depends on everything else.” Behind the joke, however, is a real recognition that
every economic decision to buy more of something means buying less of something else and
each of those decisions has still further implications not only for spending decisions but also
for investment, employment and prices. Economists skilled at this sort of analysis use 
2 Since 2005, the average weekly wage in Alberta has exceeded that in all other provinces and the gap has been
growing. As of 2013, the gap relative to the average weekly wage in Ontario was nearly $200. Relative to wages in
Quebec, the gap in 2013 was nearer to $300. See CANSIM Table 2810027. For a discussion and a finer examination
of these calculations, see Labour Market Notes, Alberta Treasury Board and Finance, May 9, 2014
(http://finance.alberta.ca/aboutalberta/labour-market-notes/2014/2014-05-labour-market-notes.pdf#page=2).
3 Using the Dutch disease argument to suggest that a boom in Alberta was harmful to the rest of the country gained
some notoriety when, in May 2012, Thomas Mulcair, leader of the federal NDP, claimed the connection. The claim
drew a speedy response from then Governor of the Bank of Canada Mark Carney who in September of the same year
remarked “While the tidiness of the argument is appealing and making commodities the scapegoat is tempting, the
diagnosis is overly simplistic and, in the end, wrong.” (Remarks by Mark Carney, Spruce Meadows Round Table,
Calgary, September 7, 2012 (http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2012/09/dutch-disease/). For a similar conclusion, see
Stephen Gordon, “The Canadian Manufacturing Sector, 2002-2008: Why is it Called Dutch Disease?”, SPP Research
Papers, The School of Public Policy, Volume 6, Issue 26, September 2013.
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sophisticated general equilibrium models to try to gain at least some rough idea of what would
be the impact of an alternative event such as a slowdown of the rate of employment growth in
Alberta. All such considerations have been swept under the carpet.
But on top of all these considerations, one would also need to take into account that
government policy choices may also have differed had Alberta’s labour market not been so
strong. For example, had Alberta not been growing so fast between 2000 and 2008, the
national unemployment rate would not have been falling — as shown by the blue line in the
figure — but would instead have been more or less stagnant. What would that have meant for
the monetary policies of the Bank of Canada? Had the Bank responded to the lacklustre
performance of the labour market by lowering interest rates, then interest rates would have
potentially been lower than they actually were entering the 2008 recession. If so, the Bank
would have had less room to use monetary policy to stimulate the economy during the latest
recession. The slower rate of growth in Alberta would also have meant that the federal budget
surplus would have been smaller, perhaps in deficit, than it was entering the depths of the
recession in 2009. Might that have limited the ability or the willingness of the federal
government to respond to the recession with a strong stimulus package? If so, how might that
have affected the recovery from the recession? Might the Canadian unemployment rate be even
higher today than the 9.39 per cent suggested by the counterfactual presented here? If so, what
would that mean for the Canadian stock market and international perceptions of the Canadian
economy as a place to invest? 
Considerations like these make it challenging to try to replay history. I have shied away from
trying to suggest I can predict what would otherwise have been. Still, it would seem hard to
suggest that the Canadian economy has not benefited from the extra 411,000 jobs that have
been the result of the Alberta economy creating jobs faster than Ontario’s. That conclusion,
though I might wrap it tightly in blankets of uncertainty typical of academics, is largely
correct. What is certainly undeniable is that were it not for the economic boom in Alberta, the
Canadian economy and the challenges being dealt with by fiscal and monetary policy makers
would be very different challenges from those they are in fact dealing with today. Few policy
makers would trade the current situation of a 7.2 per cent unemployment rate for the myriad of
problems that accompany a 9.4 per cent (and rising) unemployment rate which they would be
dealing with were it not for the extended boom in Alberta.
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